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Climate for technical innovation has been improving in the past few years in China. This Paper 
describes a case research related to technical innovation in three Chinese state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) in the manufacturing industry, by applying a Western technical audit tool. The data and 
findings reveal that the investigated Chinese SOEs have already some mechanisms for innovation in 
place but there is room for improvement and enhancement with respect to the effect on innovation 
success. It is also concluded that benchmarking (through the application of the audit tool) may not 
guarantee improved innovation performance, but it does guide management toward deciding which 
innovation mechanisms to adopt so as to provide the basics for innovation success. Last but not least 
we draw the interesting conclusion that in the economy in transition in China, companies with less 
openness to the market (i.e. with high government involvement), there was a more widespread use of 
innovation mechanisms. This finding seems to contradict the positive relationship between market 
focus and innovativeness as suggested in ‘Western’ innovation management theories, and it enriches 
to a certain extent the theory of transition. 
 
1. Introduction 
The economic environment of China has been changing 
from the centrally planned economic system to a Western-
like open market system. After two decades of gradual, 
piecemeal reform and opening-up, in particular with 
China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
the Chinese state-owned industrial enterprises, which are 
the main contributors to the government’s revenue and 
which take 66 percent of the total assets of the industrial 
sector (Liu and Gao, 1999), are now confronted with 
fierce challenges from the non-state sectors (such as the 
private economy, the township and village enterprises 
(TVEs) and the foreign-funded enterprises).  
Management of technology in China has roughly 
experienced the following phases: 
1.  Before the reform and opening-up policy in 1978, 
China had long been in a self-closed situation except 
for some technologies introduced from the former 
Soviet Union and East Europe in the 1950s. The 
whole country followed the basic tenets of “acting 
independently and with the initiative in one’s own 
hands; reconstructing through one’s own efforts”. 
The government set up technology platforms for 
industries and let the SOEs design and produce, with 
no R&D activity involved in an enterprise. A good 
example of this is like one of our case companies (i.e. 
LocoCo). It started as a locomotive repairing works. 
With the Chinese government imported the first 
locomotive from the former Soviet Union in the 
1950s, it began to have its own technology and 
production in the locomotive industry; 
2.  From the beginning of 1980s till mid-1980s, the 
Chinese state-owned manufacturing enterprises 
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imported a large number of technologies, which saw 
the focus of technology management in this period as 
technology selection and project implementation (i.e. 
technology transformation). Gu (1999) categorized 
those imported technologies into product designs; 
manufacturing techniques and equipment; production 
management techniques (including quality 
assurance); auxiliary equipment; testing techniques 
and devices and standards; 
3.   From the mid-1980s till the late 1990s, the focus was 
on the localization of imported technology, absorbing 
and assimilating technology from abroad. Thus the 
core of technology management in Chinese 
manufacturing industry was imitation and partly 
improvement. 
The above phases show some similar developments of 
the Chinese SOEs when compared with Bolwijn and 
Kumpe’s (1990) evolutionary model of Western 
manufacturing firms. Bolwijn and Kumpe (1990) 
described the evolvement of large-scale manufacturing 
firms from the 1960s to the 1990s in terms of market 
requirement and performance criteria, from “efficient 
firm” via “quality firm” and “flexible firm” to “innovative 
firm”. This observation leads us to expect that more 
attention should be paid in gaining knowledge about the 
effectiveness of management of technical innovation in 
the changing context of the Chinese SOEs.  
Since the late 1990s, the issue of technological 
innovation has been put on many firms’ agenda in China, 
which drew practitioners’ as well as scholars’ attention in 
studying innovation management in the Chinese context 
(see Gao, 1997; Fu, 1998; Liu, 2001). The above 
observations brought us the impetus to investigate the 
possibilities for the application of (Western) good practice 
in management of technical innovation to the Chinese 
SOEs. In viewing that the Chinese enterprises are 
following the similar evolution process of the Western 
innovative firms, therefore, we set up our objective of this 
research as, to explore the current innovativeness of three 
Chinese SOEs in the manufacturing industry, by applying 
a technical innovation audit tool which is based on 
Western good practices. Next to the technical innovation 
audit tool, triangulation methods (Jick, 1979), which are, 
intensive interviews, in-depth questions and observations 
are used for validating the findings.  
Numerous Western authors have provided an answer to 
the questions of why to innovate and how to innovate (see 
for example, Burgelman, Maidique and Wheelwright, 
1996; Tushman and Anderson, 1997; Tidd, Bessant and 
Pavitt, 1997; Radnor and Robinson, 2000; Brockhoff, 
Pearson, de Weerd-Nederhof and Kerssens-van 
Drongelen, 2000), but the question is what insights 
Western theories on good practice in management of 
technical innovation provide in order to contribute to the 
knowledge about the effectiveness of management of 
technical innovation in the changing context of especially 
the Chinese state-owned enterprises. In a transition 
economy from a centrally planned system to the market 
economy, we would argue that the management setting in 
China is contingent, and we need to use a holistic point of 
view to study the management of technical innovation in 
the Chinese context.  
This paper firstly describes the theory and method used 
in this research, mostly on how we used the audit tool 
developed by Chiesa et al. (1996) for data of the current 
technical innovation status in the three Chinese SOEs. In 
the meantime, a triangulation of information (Jick, 1979) 
was also collected through in-depth questions, intensive 
interviews and observations in an attempt to examine 
more deeply the cultural and behavioural activities in 
influencing the Chinese SOEs’ technical innovation 
capabilities, and to validate some of the empirical results 
via the technical  innovation audit tool. And then this 
paper illustrates the empirical data in a qualitative way, 
based on Miles and Huberman (1984). In the concluding 
section it discusses that Chinese SOEs have some 
innovation mechanisms in place but more can be done to 
adapt to the world level. Benchmarking, although it may 
not guarantee good innovation performance, may guide 
management in adopting more and other good innovation 
mechanisms as the basis for successful innovations. We 
also found that in the economy in transition in China, 
companies with less openness to the market (i.e. with high 
government involvement), there was a more widespread 
use of innovation mechanisms. This finding seems to 
contradict the positive relationship between market focus 
and innovativeness as suggested in ‘Western’ innovation 
management theories, and it enriches the theory of 
transition. 
2. Method 
2.1 Case study for this research  
Studies on technical innovation in the Chinese SOEs 
started in the 1990s, but most investigations in this field 
were based on statistical survey and mathematical 
modelling (see for example, Gao, 1997; Liu, 2001). 
However, the explanation of quantitative findings and the 
construction of theory based on those findings will 
ultimately have to be based on qualitative understanding 
(Meredith, 1998), questionnaires and models are 
constrained by rigid limits, and hard to analyse the 
software in management of innovation, e.g., human 
behaviour (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991); whereas case 
studies lead to new and creative insights, development of 
new theory, and have high validity with practitioners – the 
ultimate user of research (Voss et al., 2002). Yin (1994) 
has described in detail case study design, who argues that 
the case study is preferred in examining contemporary 
events, and when a “how” or ”why” question is being 
asked about a contemporary set of events over which the 
investigator has little or no control. Case research enriches 
not only theory, but also the researchers themselves. 
Through conducting research in the field and being 
exposed to real problems, the creative insights of people 
at all levels of organizations, and the varied contexts of 
cases, the individual researcher will personally benefit 
from the process of conducting the research (Voss et al., 
2002). We would believe a case study approach is very 
important for this research work to examine more deeply 
the cultural and behavioural activities in influencing the 
Chinese SOEs’ technical innovation capabilities. 
2.2 A Western technical innovation audit tool 
The technical innovation audit developed by Chiesa et al. 
(1996) is based on a process model (see Fig. 1), which 
addresses the managerial processes and the organizational 
mechanisms through which innovation is performed. The 
model identifies four core processes: concept generation, 
product development, process innovation, and technology 
acquisition; three enabling processes: the deployment of 
human and financial resources, the effective use of 
appropriate systems and tools, and senior management 
leadership and direction. The outcome from these core 
and enabling processes is performance in terms of 
innovation and the resulting competitiveness in the 
marketplace. 
Their technical innovation audit incorporates an 
extensive Western literature on good practices in 
management of technical innovation, and, after thorough 
field testing, it has been widely implemented in numerous 
UK companies. The use of the tool has helped those 
companies to identify relevant innovation mechanisms, 
develop innovation performance measures and audit 
innovation capability as reported in Chiesa et al. (1996). 
Chiesa et al. (1996) state that the process of innovation is 
strongly related to market focus involving the continuous 
monitoring of customers, competitors and market trends. 
They believe that the four core processes are inter-related, 
not isolated, to any innovation, and their process-based 
technical innovation model indicates that market focus is 
related to a firm’s innovation success. This seems to 
suggest that their audit tool can be applied to firms which 
are market-oriented or want to be market-oriented. To 
facilitate communication during our case study and 
sharing of Western good practice information with the 
Chinese managers during the process of our fieldwork, we 
chose this audit tool after an elaborated review for the 
assessment of the management of technical innovation 
(status quo) of the case companies, namely, LocoCo, 
BusCo and MotorCo in central China.  
2.3 Sample selection 
In this research, the three SOEs, which are state-owned 
manufacturing enterprises in the central part of the 
mainland China, were having different product and 
production technology, and focusing on different markets 
and having different size.  
Processes of Innovation 
Concept Generation Product Innovation
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Table 1. Profile of three case companies. 
Name in Short Innovation Features 
 
LocoCo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BusCo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MotorCo 
 
Top management involvement 
Strong R&D, including a national-
level R&D Centre 
Diverse sources of technology 
An outward-looking focus for 
innovation process 
Enjoy government privilege, no need 
to worry about orders 
 
Breakout profit losing 
Customer-oriented production and 
marketing 
Links with a local university 
70% are group buyers, innovation is 
to meet their needs and tastes 
 
Strong imitation strategy for the latest 
world model(s) 
Good distribution channels 
Years of profit losing makes the top 
management thinking of strategic 
change in core business due to 
government limitations in selling its 
product in cities 
 
 
Systems & Tools
Leadership
Market Focus 
Increased 
Competitive- 
ness 
Process Innovation Technology Acquisition
 Enabling Processes 
Resourcing
Source: Chiesa et al. (1996)
Figure 1. A process-based technical innovation model. 
This selection was to avoid the case comapnies being 
in the developed east area or in the less developed west 
region of mainland China. Among the selected samples, 
one (i.e. LocoCo) ranked the top 500 industrial SOEs in 
China, another (i.e. BusCo) ranked the top ten of its 
business scope and the third (i.e. MotorCo) the top five 
producer of its kind product. The first sample company 
employed around 10,000 people, and the second and the 
third employed over 2,400 and 6000 people respectively. 
All three shared the same historical background and 
similar stakeholder compositions as traditional state-
owned manufacturing companies. 
2.4 Process of data gathering 
To ensure that comparable data to be collected from each 
SOE, the same assessment tool was delivered to the key 
informants, who were the three functional managers (i.e. 
the Production Manager, the R&D/Product Development 
Manager and the Sales and Marketing Manager) and one 
(vice) General Manager or vice President in Technology. 
In order to get informed responses from the three 
companies, intensive interviews with open-ended, in-
depth questions were carried out to the key people who 
were knowledgeable about their firms’ strategic 
orientations and who took direct control of technological 
innovation activities of their enterprises.  
Detailed explanation to the scorecard was given to the 
(vice) General Manager or vice President in Technology 
and the functional managers on how to fill it out. For 
example, each item has four scales ranking from one to 
four, and scale four is considered to be the ‘world class’ 
innovation performance (see Chiesa, 1996). The use of the 
four-scale ranking presented us with bias because 
companies came to fill in a high score to make their 
company look not too bad, which has to do with the 
Chinese traditional behaviour of “preserving of face”. 
Therefore we stressed consistently the needs for the use of 
innovation mechanisms instead of the individual 
performance of their company, and we kept on refreshing 
the scales with semi-structured, in-depth questions. Their 
answers were compared with their scoring of the 
innovation scorecard. From LocoCo to MotorCo, and then 
BusCo, to keep the case research consistent, we delivered 
the same innovation assessment tool, asked the same 
questions to different informants, and kept the same 
percentage of people in answering our in-depth questions 
for reliability.  In combination with data by using 
triangulation methods, we tried to keep all information 
from diverse research methods to be in line with each 
other, and the current technical innovation situation of the 
three SOEs is depicted in Fig. 2. 
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Figure 2. A linear description of the current innovation situation in the three SOEs. 
2.5 Results to date 
After reviewing the within-case studies of the three case 
companies, the key information which is considered to be 
the results of the triangulation of methods (Jick, 1979) 
was collected. Miles and Huberman (1984) have written 
a guide for the analysis of and display of qualitative data. 
In brief, they encourage the use of tables to display key 
information, which more specifically for innovation 
research is also recommended by Radnor and Robinson 
(2000). So the key technical innovation practices within 
the three case companies are displayed in the tables 
below, including the core processes of the innovation 
process (Table 2) and the enabling processes of the 
innovation process (Table 3). 
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Table 2. The core processes of the innovation process 
 
 LocoCo BusCo MotorCo 
 
Product innovation planning 
Innovation rewards 
Innovation risk-taking 
Use of multi-discipline teams 
with early involvement 
Cross functional teamwork 
Employees involved in 
continuous improvement 
Industrial design 
Diversified technology sources 
Technology strategy identified 
New ideas from: 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
(no risk) 
No 
 
Some 
Yes 
 
No 
Yes 
Outward-looking 
R&D 
Global competitors 
Local customer needs 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
 
No 
Some 
 
Some 
No 
Inward-looking 
Customer demands 
Suppliers 
Competitors 
N/A 
No 
No 
No 
 
No 
No 
 
Some 
No 
Inward-looking 
Competitors 
Marketing 
Special magazines 
Note: According to Chiesa et al. (1996) the core processes of the innovation process consist of concept      
generation, product innovation, process innovation and technology acquirement.
 
Table 3. The enabling processes of the innovation process 
 
 LocoCo BusCo MotorCo 
 
Top management involvement 
Clear innovation goals 
Management attention to 
encourage innovation 
Training program for staff 
Innovation process properly 
funded 
Intranet and internet used to 
facilitate information and 
design 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Yes 
(short-term) 
No 
 
No 
No 
 
Some 
No 
(short-term) 
No 
 
No 
No 
 
Some 
Note: According to Chiesa et al. (1996) the enabling processes of the innovation process consist of  
      leadership, resourcing and systems and tools. 
 
A distinctive phenomenon in Fig. 2 is LocoCo has a 
better use of innovation mechanisms and a low score in 
market focus. Whereas BusCo and MotorCo are more 
market oriented with less innovation mechanisms and 
their competitiveness in the market is rather low.  
Table 2 and Table 3 summarize the use of innovation 
mechanisms in the three Chinese SOEs. These are the 
results from our fieldwork with a triangulation of 
research methods. LocoCo shows that it has already most 
innovation mechanisms in place; BusCo shows that it has 
only some mechanisms in place; and MotorCo has even 
fewer in place.  
According to Chiesa et al. (1996), management of 
technical innovation is a process which consists of all 
four core processes and three enabling processes. 
LocoCo’s has enabling processes and mechanisms in 
place and has more use of innovation mechanisms in 
their core processes, but still, there are no multi-
disciplinary teams with early involvement in a new 
project or new product development; cross-functional 
teamwork is weak; and there is almost no industrial 
design for market demand. BusCo and especially 
MotorCo still lack most technical innovation mechanisms 
in both core processes and enabling processes. These two 
companies do not want to take innovation risks because 
they think they cannot afford to fail; there is no product 
planning but they follow the popular models in the world 
with an inward-looking technology strategy. Also they 
miss most enabling processes such as innovation funds 
and human resources (we were told, for instance, that 
MotorCo’s R&D staff in 2000 even dropped from 60 to 
40, and in the company newspaper we read that 
MotorCo’s employees were complaining about the 
leadership of the top management). 
3. Discussion  
Our fieldwork with a triangulation of research methods 
(i.e. the audit tool in combination with observations, 
open-ended questions and intensive interviews to relevant 
functional managers) shows that the use of innovation 
mechanisms in the three Chinese SOEs varies. Table 2 
and Table 3 show that LocoCo has considerably more use 
of innovation mechanisms than that of BusCo and 
MotorCo, partly due to the role of its important 
stakeholder, i.e. government (see Ren, 2004). 
High Low 
 
and responding to new product or market opportunities. 
 
(low per ance) 
  MotorCo
form
The dynamics of stakeholder composition is 
considered influential to three case companies’ 
effectiveness of technical innovation management. The 
stakeholder compositions of the three companies were 
similar, but stakeholders own different attributes of 
power, legitimacy and urgency (Mitchell et al., 1997), 
especially the influence of two main stakeholders’ roles, 
namely, government and customer/market. The 
government/end user or customer influence on the 
different cases showed a high/low influence on LocoCo, 
and a low/high influence on BusCo and MotorCo. This 
seems to oppose to that in the Western world. Although 
the stakeholder situation of MotorCo and BusCo is in line 
with the Western world, it does not lead to an increased 
use of innovation mechanisms, whereas in the case of 
LocoCo, where the government still plays an important 
role, we found more use of technical innovation 
mechanisms. This was indicating that in the Chinese 
traditionally planned economy, social, political and 
institutional effects still have dominant impact on SOEs’ 
innovation competitiveness. Stakeholders’ influence on 
technical innovation is prominent, and this is especially 
true for the transitional economic situation of China. The 
stakeholders are important for the management of 
technical innovation of the Chinese SOEs because they 
provide the SOEs with scarce resources, which determine 
the smooth implementation of technical innovation. 
Based on our studies on innovation mechanisms used 
in the case companies and the stakeholder influence 
discussed above, we realize that there are essentially 
three dimensions that indicate the current innovation 
situation of the three SOEs, illustrating the relationships 
between the change in stakeholder situation and the use 
of innovation mechanisms: Use of innovation 
mechanisms, Openness to the market and Governmental 
influence. On the one hand, LocoCo has the highest use 
of innovation mechanisms and a low position in market 
focus. On the other hand, BusCo and MotorCo are more 
market oriented with less innovation mechanisms and 
their competitiveness in the market is rather low. In our 
research, the intriguing finding was that in the transition 
economy of China, the higher the openness to the market 
and lower protection of the government, the less 
innovative and competitive the company. To put it in 
other words, BusCo and MotorCo seem to have to 
“defend” their own “turfs”. More precisely, LocoCo is in 
a (semi-) monopoly sector with a lower openness to the 
market and higher protection of the government in 
various aspects, but its innovation performance is high. 
For MotorCo, it is the other way around. The interface of 
the openness to the market and government interference, 
and the innovation performance of BusCo are in between 
of LocoCo and MotorCo. 
Based on our research we can roughly draw the 
conclusion that the prominent influence by the Chinese 
government’s control on SOEs’, such as personnel 
appointment and interference on managerial issues have 
been found to negatively influence the vitality of the 
SOEs, especially in the aspects of technological 
innovation capability and creativity. Surprisingly 
however, large-scaled Chinese SOEs like LocoCo, which 
in the past decades have saved cumulative technology 
and equipment and still enjoy the government’s 
privileges in financial appraisal and industrial policies, 
will take the lead among the Chinese SOEs to be 
innovative in the short run; other large and medium SOEs 
with market-orientedness will be staying in the dilemma 
situation whether to take the risk of innovation or to 
“wait for death” without innovation. 
What we could find was the shift of stakeholder 
composition of the SOEs, but we found no evidence that 
SOEs that became more market-oriented became more 
innovative in product and process than those who are still 
in the semi-closed market despite of industry maturity. In 
our research, for example, MotorCo and BusCo are more 
open but much less innovative. The research also 
substantiates that incurring debt motivates managers to 
sacrifice long-term investment in favour of short-term 
cash flow. This seems to oppose the Western literature 
and theory in which market-orientedness is supposed to 
lead to increased use of innovation mechanisms. In the 
innovation process model of Chiesa et al. (1996), for 
example, the market trend is also seen as the main 
driving force for the carry out of technical innovation, 
indicating that Western firms in competitive situation 
take innovation as a means to increase competitiveness in 
the marketplace. One would expect that the changing 
stakeholder situation of the Chinese SOEs, when 
confronted with the market situation, should generate 
industrial innovation within the firms and bring more 
orders from the market automatically. But this did not 
happen in our three cases, and it even seems to go the 
other way around. Looking for explanations for all these 
facts, we look at Miles et al.’s (1978) theoretical 
framework for the analysis of organizations in their 
adaptive processes. 
According to the characteristics of the four strategic 
types of organizations identified by Miles et al. (1978), 
the three case companies in this research could be firstly 
mapped into the category of Defenders, whose success 
comes primarily from efficiently serving a stable domain 
and whose primary risk is that of ineffectiveness. But 
with China’s reform and opening-up policy, the three 
SOEs have had to adapt themselves to the changing 
economic environment. Started as a Defender, BusCo 
and MotorCo held the administrative problem of how to 
maintain strict control of the organization in order to 
ensure efficiency. As a result, their administrative system 
as well as technology are ideally suited to maintain 
stability and efficiency but are not well suited to locating 
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Figure 2. The relationship between the openness to the market and the
government influence and use of innovation mechanisms in the three
Chinese SOEs. 
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